

DACOWITS

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services



1951-2011: 60 Years of DACOWITS



2011
REPORT

**Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services (DACOWITS)**
4000 Defense Pentagon, Room 2C548A
Washington, District of Columbia 20301-4000

We, the appointed members of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), do hereby submit the results of our findings and offer our recommendations to improve the policies, procedures, and climate within the Department of Defense.




Nancy Duff Campbell
DACOWITS Vice-Chair




COL(Ret) Margarethe Cammermeyer



BG(Ret) Julia J. Cleckley




Honorable Ruby B. DeMesme



SgtMajMC (Ret) John L. Estrada



Holly K. Hemphill



Honorable Deborah Lee James



BG(Ret) Maureen K. LeBoeuf

LTG (Ret) Claudia J. Kennedy, who chaired the Committee until September 30, also contributed to the work and recommendations of the Committee in 2011.

Table of Contents

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

Executive Summary	i
Introduction	1
Wellness Research and Recommendations	3
Summary of Select Briefings Presented to DACOWITS	3
Summary of Focus Group Findings	6
Relevant Literature and Other Resources	9
Recommendations	10
Continuing Concerns	11
Assignments Research and Recommendations	13
Summary of Select Briefings Presented to DACOWITS	13
Summary of Focus Group Findings	15
Relevant Literature and Other Resources	17
Recommendations	19
Best Practices	20
Endnotes	23
Appendices	27

Executive Summary

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services



The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was established in 1951. Its mandate is to provide the Secretary of Defense with advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the women in the Armed Forces of the United States. The individuals who comprise the Committee are appointed by the Secretary of Defense to serve in a voluntary capacity for three-year terms.

As in the previous year, in 2011 DACOWITS divided its work into two general areas, Wellness and Assignments, with subcommittees formed for each. The subcommittees selected specific topics for study, as described below.

To undertake its work on the selected topics, the Committee gathered both primary and secondary sources of information, including briefings from military representatives and subject matter experts; data collected during installation visits from focus groups and surveys; and literature reviews, other survey data and available research and resources. These sources of information formed the basis for the Committee’s reasoning and recommendations.

The Committee agreed on recommendations at its September 2011 meeting. The Committee approved this report at its December 2011 meeting.

Wellness Recommendations and Continuing Concerns

DACOWITS has addressed the issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment several times in past years. Most recently, in 2010 the Committee received briefings from the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and reviewed relevant literature. The Committee observed that DoD and the Services have necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis on data collection and on response efforts once an assault has occurred, including improvements in reporting procedures for sexual assaults and in services to sexual assault victims. They have also emphasized and refined training programs

as an important prevention tool. The Committee determined in 2011 to focus its work on further efforts that might be made to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment in the first instance, with a view to reducing their incidence within the military community and thereby promoting the wellness of female Service members.

As explained in more detail in the full 2011 report, DACOWITS made the following recommendations, based on the reasoning set forth below, and also identified some continuing concerns.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: This recommendation is three-fold and addresses the Committee’s view that publicizing the outcomes of sexual assault cases more broadly within the military, and on an installation level, would be helpful in reducing sexual assaults.

Recommendation

- DoD should publicize reports of sexual assault and their dispositions in a simple format accessible to a wide military audience, to be used in required training and other venues.
- DoD should consider requiring local commanders to publicize, in a timely manner, this same information, including information on reports and dispositions at their specific installations.
- Sexual assault information to be publicized should include the number of reports and type of disciplinary actions taken as a result of sexual assault investigations. Because there may be valid reasons why disciplinary action is not taken in some cases, reasons should be provided for cases where no action is taken. All such information should be in aggregate form, as necessary to conform to any applicable privacy or other legal requirements, taking into account the needs of the victim as appropriate.

Reasoning

Focus group participants stated that Service members are generally unaware of the extent to which there has been follow-up on reported sexual assaults and the disciplinary or other action that has been taken. This lack of awareness makes it hard for Service members to assess whether sexual assaults are actually taken seriously and may contribute to the perception that an individual's rank affects the outcome. This lack of awareness may also lead perpetrators to believe that they are at little risk of being held to account. Finally, lack of awareness may lead to lack of confidence in the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response process and to a consequent unwillingness to report assaults. Publicizing information on case dispositions should demonstrate that the military as a whole, as well as individual units, do not tolerate sexual assault and will discipline fairly. Including information on why disciplinary action is not taken in some cases should also foster increased confidence in the system, potentially leading both to fewer assaults and greater reporting of assaults that do occur. This recommendation is consistent not only with focus group participant recommendations but also with research that shows that publicizing enforcement activities and disciplinary outcomes may deter crimes by making clear the cost to the offender.

Although this recommendation pertains to sexual assault, many of the same considerations could apply to sexual harassment cases. The Committee has identified as a continuing concern for possible further consideration whether DoD and the Services should give more attention to the prevention of sexual harassment (as distinct from sexual assault) and the ways in which this might be accomplished. A report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on preventing sexual harassment in the military, which was released after DACOWITS voted on its 2011 recommendations, may be especially relevant to any further examination of sexual harassment issues.

Recommendation 2: DoD should include measures of sexual assault and sexual harassment in command climate assessments.

Reasoning

Focus group research and DoD surveys reveal widespread agreement among Service members that sexual assault and sexual harassment have negative effects on military readiness. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated with respect to sexual assault, "This type of act in the military not only does unconscionable harm to the victim; it destabilizes the workplace and threatens national security." Both focus group and other research reveal that a positive command climate can help prevent sexual assault and harassment. Yet measures of sexual assault and sexual harassment are not consistently and expressly taken into account in command climate assessments. Including these measures in command climate assessments could help ensure that prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment is a command priority.

Although this recommendation pertains to command climate assessments, many of the same considerations could apply to including sexual assault and sexual harassment measures in individual performance evaluations of commanders, and the Committee has identified this as a continuing concern for possible further consideration.

Continuing Concerns

In the course of examining sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention, the Committee identified several continuing concerns for possible further consideration.

- Whether DoD and the Services should place greater attention on prevention of sexual harassment as distinct from sexual assault.
- Whether effectiveness in combating sexual assault and sexual harassment should be made a part of individual performance evaluations of installation commanders and other leaders.
- Whether additional specialized training should be required for investigators, counselors and victim advocates in sexual assault matters.
- Whether there are special problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the recruiting process and, if so, how they should be addressed.

Assignments Recommendations and Best Practices

In 2010, DACOWITS recommended that DoD eliminate its 1994 combat exclusion policy, thereby ending gender-based restrictions on military assignments and opening all career fields/specialties, schooling and training opportunities that have been closed to women. As a follow-up to this recommendation, in 2011 DACOWITS decided to examine ways to effectively and fully integrate women into ground combat units, including any potential barriers to such integration. In addition, based on reports gathered by the Committee in 2010, in 2011 DACOWITS decided to examine the adequacy of the weapons training female Service members receive in preparation for deployment to combat zones.

As explained in more detail in the full 2011 report, DACOWITS made the following recommendations, based on the reasoning set forth below, and also suggested some best practices:

Recommendation 1: DoD should eliminate the 1994 combat exclusion policy and direct the Services to eliminate their respective assignment rules, thereby ending the gender-based restrictions on military assignments. Concurrently, DoD and the Services should open all related career fields/specialties, schooling and training opportunities that have been closed to women as a result of the DoD combat exclusion policy and service assignment policies.

Reasoning

This recommendation repeats the recommendation made by DACOWITS in 2010. As described in DACOWITS' 2010 Report, that recommendation was grounded in focus group and other research gathered by the Committee in 2009 and additional research supporting the expansion of roles of women gathered by the Committee in 2010. Because DoD is, at this time, reviewing the 1994 combat exclusion policy in response to a congressional directive to do so, DACOWITS believes it is important to repeat and re-emphasize this recommendation. Moreover, the Committee continued to find strong support for this recommendation in its focus group and other research conducted this

year, including in the final report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission and the statements of high-ranking DoD personnel. Equally important, the Committee found no insurmountable obstacles to integrating women into currently closed positions.

Recommendation 2: The Services should develop appropriate physical standards by MOS, relevant to the job to be performed.

Reasoning

The Committee's 2010 recommendation, repeated above in 2011, would end gender-based restrictions on military assignments. This would mean opening to women combat arms career fields and MOSs that are currently closed and allowing women to compete for all assignments for which they are qualified. However, the Committee is concerned that DoD and the Services, in the review that they are currently undertaking of assignment policies for women, may be evaluating women on an "average" rather than an individual basis and may be using or establishing standards to judge women's qualifications that have not been validated, even for men. Instead, the selection of military personnel for assignment should be based on individual qualifications, not on gender or other stereotyped concepts of women's or men's capabilities. The qualifications should be those necessary to perform the actual duties of a specific military job. Any standards for the job, especially physical standards, should be validated to ensure that they accurately predict job performance.

Recommendation 3: In addition to a general increase in quality of pre-deployment weapons training, the Services should ensure that deployed Service members receive appropriate in-country weapons training on the weapons used by the units in which they are serving in theatre.

Reasoning

Focus group participants, both men and women, described their pre-deployment weapons training as inadequate in some respects. Some reported receiving a bare minimum of training, and some complained

about the quality and consistency of the training. Additionally, some women focus group participants reported that, once in theatre, they were issued new weapons on which they had not been previously trained and that weapons training while deployed was inadequate. The Committee believes that weapons training both pre- and post-deployment should be improved for both women and men Service members.

Best Practices

In the course of examining ways to effectively integrate women into combat units, DACOWITS identified, and wishes to suggest, several best practices.

Best Practice 1: Leaders should adopt practices similar to those that were implemented during the process of the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell, in which they visibly support the integration of women into currently closed positions.

Comment

Leadership is key to the successful implementation of new policies and programs. It is very apparent that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines get on board with new programs when the leaders at all levels of the organization support the new policies and programs and actively demonstrate their support, including during briefings and training.

Best Practice 2: The Services should employ a phased approach for a full integration of women into all currently closed combat assignments. At a minimum, several women should be integrated into units at a time. The integration should occur in the combat engineers, artillery, and armor followed by the infantry.

Comment

The integration of women into combat units will require that some facilities be modified, training be

reviewed, and testing be conducted to ensure that job-related standards are employed in selecting Service members for particular assignments. Navy experience in bringing women onto warships supports the practice of integrating women into currently closed units several at a time. Further, since women are already present in some MOSs and various levels in the combat engineers and artillery, the transition of women into these units should be relatively easy. The transition into armor and infantry could require more time and effort.

Best Practice 3: DoD and the Services should have more of an emphasis on mentorship, both formal and informal. However, leadership needs to encourage and support informal mentorship.

Comment

During focus group sessions the importance of mentorship was discussed. Although mentoring is important to all Service members, it will be especially important for the women who are integrated into combat units. Informal mentoring, because it is not done to meet a requirement, can be more appealing because all involved have chosen to be in a mentoring relationship.

Best Practice 4: The Services should assure their recruitment policies fully support the successful integration of women into the combat arms.

Comment

If restrictions on the assignment of women are lifted as DACOWITS has recommended, it will be important for all Services to attract and recruit both men and women to serve in the combat arms. Some current policies may unnecessarily discourage potential recruits from considering such service – and possibly service in the military itself. For example, the Marines tell recruits that they may be put into the infantry involuntarily, even though such involuntary assignments seldom occur. The Marine Corps should review its policy of involuntarily assigning recruits to infantry.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was established in 1951. Its mandate is to provide the Secretary of Defense with advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the women in the Armed Forces of the United States. (See *Appendix A* for the DACOWITS charter.) The individuals who comprise the Committee are appointed by the Secretary of Defense to serve in a voluntary capacity for three-year terms. (See *Appendix B* for biographies of the 2011 DACOWITS Committee members.)

As in the previous year, in 2011 DACOWITS divided its work into two general areas, Wellness and Assignments, with subcommittees formed for each. For Wellness, the Committee examined prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the military. For Assignments, the Committee, following up on its 2010 recommendation to eliminate DoD's 1994 combat exclusion policy – which would open all military assignments to women – examined ways to effectively and fully integrate women into ground combat units and the adequacy of weapons training received by military women in preparation for deployment.

To undertake this examination, the Committee gathered both primary and secondary sources of information, including briefings from military representatives and subject matter experts; data collected during installation visits from focus groups and surveys; and literature reviews, including other survey

data and available research and resources. As a primary source of information, DACOWITS collected data from site visits to eight military installations during June and July 2011. (See *Appendix C* for installations visited.) Committee members facilitated focus group discussions at each site in order to assess the views, attitudes and experiences of Service members on the identified topics. Mini-surveys were also distributed to participants to determine the demographic composition of the groups and to assess their basic attitudes towards the topics at hand. In all, DACOWITS conducted 44 focus groups – 23 on Wellness topics and 21 on Assignments topics – with 425 participants. Consistent with past years, staff from an independent research firm (ICF International) recorded written transcripts of the discussions and compiled and analyzed the resulting data in collaboration with the Committee. Focus group methodology and results are described further in relevant parts of Chapters II and III.

Chapter II covers the Committee's research and recommendations on the Wellness topic. Chapter III covers the Committee's research and recommendations on the Assignment topics. Appendices are also provided, including: DACOWITS charter, biographies of DACOWITS members, list of installations visited, focus group protocols, mini-surveys, mini-survey results, focus group findings, literature reviews, list of briefings presented to DACOWITS, and acronyms used in the report.

Chapter 2

Wellness Research and Recommendations

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services



DACOWITS has addressed the issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment several times in past years. Most recently, in 2010 the Committee received briefings from the Department of Defense's (DoD) Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and reviewed relevant literature. The Committee observed that DoD and the Services have necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis on data collection and response efforts once an assault has occurred, including improvements in reporting procedures for sexual assaults and in services to sexual assault victims. They have also emphasized and refined training programs as an important prevention tool. The Committee determined in 2011 to focus its work on further efforts that might be made to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment in the first instance, with a view to reducing their incidence within the military community and thereby promoting the wellness of female Service members.

To undertake this examination, the Committee gathered data directly from Service members in focus groups, received briefings from knowledgeable DoD and Services personnel, as well as an outside expert, and researched current literature and other resources. This chapter summarizes DACOWITS' findings, recommendations, the reasoning behind these recommendations, and some continuing concerns on these topics. The chapter is organized into the following sections:

- Summary of Select Briefings Presented to DACOWITS
- Summary of Focus Group Findings
- Relevant Literature and Other Resources
- Recommendations
- Continuing Concerns

Summary of Select Briefings Presented to DACOWITS

DACOWITS' research on sexual assault and sexual harassment in the U.S. military included briefings on efforts being undertaken to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment on college campuses and their application to the U.S. military; current efforts by DoD to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment, including by implementing recent congressional directives; and the effectiveness of DoD preventative policies as reflected in the 2010 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey by the Defense Manpower Data Center. This section presents highlights from these briefings; for a full list of briefings presented to DACOWITS in 2011, see *Appendix I*.

Sexual Assault Prevention in the Military, March 2011

Dr. Connie Best, Professor and Director of Adult Services, National Crime Victims Research & Treatment Center, Medical University of South Carolina

As one of the first briefings received by DACOWITS in 2011, Dr. Connie Best presented an overview of prevention efforts in educational settings and their potential application to the military. She began by reviewing the widespread negative impact of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the military on the victim, other Service members, families, readiness, and DoD's overall image. Drawing on the data in the 2009 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military of DoD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), she noted that there had been an 11% increase in the number of unrestricted reports of sexual assault in the military, but that the change may be attributable to the establishment of both restricted and unrestricted reporting. In restricted reporting, a victim

may receive support and treatment without triggering a criminal investigation or being personally identified. Dr. Best stressed the importance of prevention efforts to decrease rates of assault within the military population. She reviewed current national survey research by her colleague, Dr. Dean Kilpatrick, on the prevalence of drug-facilitated, incapacitated and forcible rape of college women, noting that the vast majority of these rapes go unreported.

Dr. Best recommended the Committee consider best practices in the civilian sector for application within the military, particularly practices on college campuses. College students share many similarities with military members including:

- Demographics (e.g., age, living away from home and support systems)
- Potentially seeing the offender on a daily basis
- Engaging in similar leisure activities (e.g., involving alcohol consumption)
- Sharing many of the same barriers to reporting

She then described interventions that have been found to be successful in engaging this population (e.g., interactive videos, group exercises). In addition, she highlighted the particular benefit of bystander involvement training, which encourages each individual to consider his or her role and obligation in preventing sexual assault and harassment. She also emphasized the role of leadership and the importance of taking action against perpetrators in preventing assault and harassment. She stated that giving high visibility to punishment of offenders is helpful.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) 2010 Annual Report Results, June 2011

Dr. Suzanne Holroyd, SAPRO, and SAPRO Update, September 2011 — Major General Mary Kay Hertog, Director, SAPRO

Dr. Suzanne Holroyd and Maj Gen Mary Kay Hertog provided updates on SAPRO's efforts to address sexual assault in the military, including prevention efforts.

In a June 2011 briefing, Dr. Holroyd reviewed the findings of SAPRO's mandated 2010 annual report and related data from the Defense Manpower Data Center

(DMDC) *2010 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members*. She discussed SAPRO's efforts to increase Service members' confidence to report and to improve training on reporting options, recognizing that SAPRO still saw room for improvement in this area. Dr. Holroyd stated that there has been a 105% increase in reporting in the past six years, indicating to SAPRO that there has been progress in confronting underreporting problems. The main barriers to making a report include the desire to protect privacy, concerns about lack of confidentiality in the report, and the belief that the incident was not serious enough to report.

Specifically with respect to prevention, Dr. Holroyd noted that SAPRO has been focusing on bystander intervention training and that the 2010 DMDC survey showed a 35% drop in the number of women Service members and a 50% drop in the number of men Service members experiencing "unwanted sexual contact"¹ since 2006. She also stated that 52% of command actions against perpetrators in 2010, as compared to 30% in 2007, resulted in courts martial. Dr. Holroyd stated that the most important aspects in prevention include being in a supportive environment and raising the level of dialogue to improve prevention. In response to a question about DoD's efforts to confront command climates that may contribute to assault, Dr. Holroyd said that a new assessment on the command climate is forthcoming.

In a September 2011 briefing, Maj Gen Hertog, the new Director of SAPRO, presented her goals for SAPRO moving forward, which include balancing collaboration and responsiveness across agencies with the current budget realities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Maj Gen Hertog reviewed pending policy revisions, which include the establishment of a Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database at the DoD level, expedited transfer options, enhanced training requirements for commanders and military responders (law enforcement, counsel, medics and chaplains), nationally credentialed Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) or victim advocates to help survivors, and the possibility of retaining sexual assault evidence and documents for a longer period of time. She stated that there are Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) challenges at joint bases. SAPR services exist at these bases, but each Service seems to operate independently.

SAPRO is leading a working group to determine what is and is not working at joint bases.

Specifically with respect to prevention, Maj Gen Hertog stated that she believes the right command climate is critical to prevention, reporting, and prosecution of sexual assault, and noted that an increased number of reports may indicate a command climate in which victims feel comfortable coming forward. She also reported on current efforts to evaluate command climate. SAPRO is working with the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) to draft sexual assault questions to be introduced to the Organizational Climate Survey in January 2012. In response to the Committee's Request for Information about policies on publicizing the results of sexual assault reports, Maj Gen Hertog stated that SAPRO summarizes case outcomes in its annual report. She also stated that there is no policy preventing leaders from publicizing case outcomes on their installations, but added that leaders ought to consider any unintended consequences, such as compromising victims' privacy concerns, before publicizing case outcomes.

Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Authorization Act Requirements for Improved Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, June 2011

Diana Rangoussis, Esq. Senior Policy Advisor, SAPRO

Ms. Diana Rangoussis reported on DoD's efforts, to date, to implement the requirements of the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) designed to improve sexual assault prevention and response. Under Title XVI, section 1602 of NDAA, DoD must develop a comprehensive policy on sexual assault prevention and response in the Armed Forces by 30 March 2012 that includes certain elements set forth in the new law. She reported on DoD's progress in implementing several of these elements, including consistent terminology definitions, staffing upgrades, and expanded victim services. She also described some proposed FY 2012 NDAA provisions on sexual assault and DoD's view of them. With respect to both the FY 2011 and FY 2012 provisions, most relate to reporting, staffing, and victim services rather than particularly to prevention efforts.

DoD Sexual Harassment Policy Overview, September 2011

Mr. Jimmy Love, Acting Director, Military Equal Opportunity/Equal Employment Opportunity & Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Liaison, Office of Diversity Management & Equal Opportunity

Mr. Jimmy Love reviewed the current sexual harassment policy within DoD and stated that DoD is currently in the process of re-issuing Directive 1350.2 as a DoD instruction to update policy, assign responsibilities and implement policy and procedures for the DoD Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, which will occur by the end of October 2011. DoD Directive 1350.2:

- Prohibits unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, or sex, including sexual harassment
- Defines roles for each DoD component in addressing unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment
- Identifies specific roles of senior leaders in the Services
- Clarifies the procedures for processing and resolving unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment complaints

The MEO Program is also collaborating with the Service Military Equal Opportunity offices to implement Service best practices, with an emphasis on long-term goals, objectives, and milestones, as well as institutionalizing leadership accountability.

Specifically with respect to prevention, Mr. Love addressed DACOWITS' Request for Information on publicizing the outcomes of sexual assault and harassment complaints. He stated that installation commanding officers have publicized summaries of formal complaints in base newspapers and town hall sessions and can do so in other ways as long as privacy is not violated. He said this has usually been done as general information similar to that provided in police blotters. Mr. Love knew of no DoD policy pertaining to this, which suggests it is at the discretion of the Service branch or installation command whether to publicize the outcomes (e.g., offender punishment and dismissal) of sexual assault investigations.

**Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
2010 Workplace and Gender Relations
Survey of Active Duty Members, June 2010**

Dr. Lindsay Rock & Dr. Rachel Lipari, DMDC

Dr. Rachel Lipari and Dr. Lindsay Rock provided a briefing on the results and implications from DMDC’s most recent survey of active duty members on gender issues, including sexual harassment and assault. These surveys provide some basis for assessing the effectiveness of DoD efforts to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment. This is the first such survey since 2006. Dr. Lipari said that incidence rates for unwanted sexual contact (USC)² declined for both women (6.8 to 4.7%) and men (1.8 to 0.9%) from 2006 to 2010. She said that the Army and Marine Corps have higher incidence rates of USC for women than the other Services, and junior enlisted personnel are most likely to experience this behavior. The majority of women who experienced USC did not report it, commonly citing that they did not want anyone to know, they felt uncomfortable making a report, they did not think their report would be kept confidential, and/or they were afraid of retaliation/reprisals. More women in 2010 believed that their performance evaluation/chance for promotion would suffer if they reported, compared with 2006.

Dr. Lipari reported that the incidence rate for sexual harassment also declined for women, from 33% in 2006 to 21% in 2010. The rate for men declined from 6% to 3% over the same period. The highest incidences, for both women and men, were of crude/offensive behavior, then unwanted sexual attention, then sexual coercion. Despite these data, Dr. Lipari reported that surveys also reveal the percentage of Service members with at least four years of service who believe that sexual assault is more of a problem in the military than it was four years ago has increased (32% of women and 21% of men in 2010 versus 25% of women and 15% of men in 2006), as has the percentage who think sexual harassment is more of a problem in the military than it was four years ago (29% of women and 20% of men in 2010 versus 23% of women and 15% of men in 2006). Dr. Lipari believes the differential between incidence and perception of incidence is attributable to the fact that SAPRO’s efforts are increasing

awareness among Service members of both sexual assault and sexual harassment.

Dr. Lipari also presented various data on the characteristics of incidents, victims’ reasons for not reporting an incident, and the training provided to try to prevent incidents and encourage reporting of incidents, stating that the majority of those Service members who received training reported it was moderately or very effective in reducing/preventing sexual assault.

Summary of Focus Group Findings

During the summer of 2011, DACOWITS conducted a total of 23 focus groups at eight locations to inform its work on the prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment. A total of 226 participants attended the focus groups, with an average of 10 participants per session. Groups were held with personnel from all Active Component (AC) Services and some elements of the Reserve Component (RC).

Slightly more than half of participants were women (56%). Almost half of the participants were non-Hispanic White (48%), just over a quarter were non-Hispanic Black (28%), and just over ten percent were Hispanic (11%). The Army was the most represented Service, with just under a quarter of participants (22%), and the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard were more or less equally represented, each comprising between 16% and 20% of the participants. The Marines, Reserves and Army National Guard were also represented, each comprising slightly fewer than 10% of the participants. Half of participants were junior or senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs; E5-E9; 50%), and almost a third were officers (O1-O6 including Warrant and Chief Warrant Officers; 32%). Over half of participants had served more than 10 years in the military (54%). The majority of participants were married (62%). For a complete summary of the demographic characteristics of these focus group participants, see *Appendix F-1*.

The methodology used to identify salient themes was consistent with the approach the Committee has employed previously. Specifically, the Committee, in partnership with social scientists from the Committee’s research contractor ICF, first developed focus group and survey instruments tailored

to address the research questions of interest to DACOWITS. Contractor staff also served as scribes, accompanying the Committee members who served as facilitators for each focus group, and generating a written transcript from the session. Each individual focus group transcript was then content-analyzed by ICF to identify major themes and sub-themes. The purpose of the sample-wide analysis was to determine the most salient comments throughout the focus group sessions, i.e., themes that appear most frequently within and across focus group sessions.

The questions posed to the focus groups were intended to gain insight on Service members’ perceptions of the prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the military, their understanding of the procedures in place for the reporting of and response to incidents, their awareness of and views on the effectiveness of military prevention programs, and their views on what could be done to enhance prevention efforts. For purposes of the focus groups, the DoD definitions of the terms sexual assault (a crime) and sexual harassment (a form of unlawful sex discrimination) were expressly provided, in order to distinguish the two. The definitions may be found in the Focus Group Protocols for Wellness at *Appendices D-1* and *D-2*.

**Prevalence of Sexual Assault
Today and Over Time**

DACOWITS asked focus group participants a series of questions about their perception of the prevalence of sexual assault in the military. Opinions were mixed, with some participants stating sexual assault is a frequent or common occurrence, and others stating it happens only occasionally or rarely. Some participants noted that their perception of the frequency of sexual assault was based not on direct knowledge of sexual assault incidents, but rather on media accounts or statistics provided in sexual assault prevention and response training. Participants also provided divergent opinions on whether the frequency of sexual assault in the military had changed over time. Several participants believed assaults are occurring with greater frequency now than before and a nearly equal number believed the opposite to be true, with some participants unsure about the matter. Of note, a few participants believed that more victims are now reporting sexual assault than before;

with some participants believing that this could be attributed to heightened awareness of reporting procedures and greater willingness among victims to come forward and report sexual assault incidents.

**Prevalence of Sexual Harassment
Today and Over Time**

DACOWITS also asked participants to comment on their perception of the prevalence of sexual harassment in the military. Although opinions were mixed, most focus group participants stated that sexual harassment is prevalent in the military today, and most stated that its prevalence had not changed much over time. Several female focus group participants expressed difficulty discerning what constitutes sexual harassment, and a small number of male Service members expressed a belief that sexual harassment was not prevalent in the military and is instead a form of hazing. In some instances, junior women Service members expressed a degree of tolerance of behaviors that senior women Service members said they would not tolerate. Among those who believed harassment had declined, some participants attributed the decline to increased prevention training, while others attributed it to a shift toward a climate less tolerant of sexual harassment. Among Service members who believed harassment has persisted or increased, some attributed the cause to leadership not taking a strong enough stance to prevent it. Some participants saw a difference between junior and senior Service members in that junior members may see sexual harassment as “coming with the job” and so may not understand how to deal with it.

**Awareness & Effectiveness
of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Prevention Training**

Most focus group participants reported that they have received some form of sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention training. Some participants said that prevention training is part of a larger culture shift, and believed that this training will contribute to an eventual decline in both sexual assault and sexual harassment. DACOWITS asked Service members what methods lead to effective program delivery. Most often, focus group participants thought that in-person presentations, small group discussions, and role-plays were the most effective forms of sexual assault and harassment prevention programming.

Overall, participants considered prevention trainings to be effective for both sexual assault and sexual harassment. With regards to sexual assault prevention specifically, several participants noted the effectiveness of bystander intervention training. Participants in one focus group reported that training that specifically addressed the relationship between alcohol and sexual assault was also an effective prevention strategy.

Participants in several groups noted they had received regular training on sexual harassment. Most of these participants felt the training was effective in at least one of two ways: providing effective and informative definitions and examples of acceptable behavior and harassment and educating Service members on how to effectively respond to and report sexual harassment. In a few instances, members made specific references to the Sexual Harassment and Response Prevention training (SHARP) and the Prevention of Sexual Harassment training (POSH) in Army as effective sexual harassment training programs.

Role of Leadership in Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Prevention

Focus group participants frequently discussed the important role leadership plays in preventing both sexual assault and sexual harassment by assuring an appropriate command climate. Service members expressed a desire for leaders to serve as role models by treating sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention seriously – both in their daily lives and by participating in prevention trainings.

Awareness and Effectiveness of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Reporting Procedures

Focus group participants discussed a wide variety of reporting options available to victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Specific resources identified by Service members for reporting sexual assault included: SAPRO, the chaplain, a SARC, a victim advocate, and one’s supervisor. For sexual harassment specifically, a few Service members identified the Equal Opportunity office as the appropriate resource. On occasion, junior female Service members expressed uncertainty about

the resources available to them to report an incident of sexual assault or sexual harassment.

Service members reported, in general, that instances of both sexual assault and sexual harassment are underreported. Service members expressed mixed views on the topic of reporting procedure effectiveness. Overall, several participants expressed that the current sexual assault and sexual harassment reporting procedures are effective, sharing that as reporting options have increased, victims have felt more comfortable submitting reports. The majority of participants, however, believed barriers to reporting sexual assault and sexual harassment still remain.

The most commonly expressed barrier leading to underreporting of sexual assault incidents was a lack of trust in both the unrestricted and restricted reporting systems, which may lead victims to utilize resources off-base. Additionally, a small number of participants thought that those who have experienced a sexual assault may often tell the wrong person and receive incorrect direction on how to manage the situation. Participants also commonly expressed the view that victims may be unwilling to report sexual assaults in cases where alcohol was involved out of fear of being reprimanded for underage drinking.

Many Service members thought that sexual harassment, specifically, was underreported because individuals either were not aware it was occurring, or they did not feel it was serious enough to report it and felt compelled to “suck it up” and manage the situation on their own. Service members also reported sexual harassment complaints in particular often get “swept under the rug” and are not taken seriously.

Less frequently, Service members discussed fear of the stigma associated with reporting sexual misconduct – including both sexual assault and sexual harassment – although several focus group members thought that the fear of stigma had declined over time. Several participants noted that the stigma of reporting is stronger for male than female victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment.

Perceived Justice

Service members frequently expressed frustration about the lack of clear punishments for offenders of both sexual assault and sexual harassment, reporting that they could not tell whether measures in place to punish offenders were being enforced and that, to the extent they were, it appeared that punishments vary widely. Several male Service members provided suggestions for how to use offender punishment as a tool to prevent future sexual assault and sexual harassment. Suggestions included clearly publicizing what happens to offenders and using offender experiences and punishments as examples during prevention training.

Perceptions of Punishment Differences by Rank

Participants were asked about their views on the role rank plays when an individual is accused of sexual assault or sexual harassment. Opinions on this issue varied by the rank of participants. Frequently, junior Service members stated that their peers were likely to be punished more severely than senior Service members when accused of either sexual assault or sexual harassment, and that senior Service members were more likely than junior Service members to be encouraged to retire without severe punishment. In contrast, senior Service members stated that their peers were likely to receive stricter punishment than junior Service members. Rarely, focus group participants thought that both junior and senior Service member offenders are punished equally. Occasionally, Service members discussed the impact of the “good old boys” club on sexual assault and sexual harassment offenders, stating that those who are in the club are much more likely to receive preferential treatment when accused of sexual assault or sexual harassment than those who are not.

Impact of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment on Unit Readiness

Most Service members thought that sexual assault has a negative impact on a unit’s readiness and ability to perform its mission by distracting Service members from their ultimate charge and negatively impacting trust within the unit. One Service member also mentioned the impact of high profile sexual assault cases on unit pride.

The responses were similar on sexual harassment. Overall, most Service members thought that sexual harassment creates an environment of distrust that negatively affects unit readiness and the mission as a whole. Some Service members additionally stated that it is difficult to perform one’s duties in a harassing and hostile work environment.

Relevant Literature and Other Resources

The following review of literature and other resources focuses on prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Additional resources are summarized in *Appendix H-1*.

Focus group participants told DACOWITS that command climate is important for success of prevention programs. Academic literature confirms this. Research has shown that an institutional culture of male dominance and stereotypical gendered beliefs fosters an environment conducive to sexual assault and sexual harassment.^{3,4,5} Although this research has mainly been done in educational institutions, as Dr. Connie Best stated in her briefing to the Committee, it is reasonable to apply educational research on sexual assault and sexual harassment to the military given the similarities between the higher education and military populations in several respects.

Focus group participants also told DACOWITS that they were unaware of the results of sexual assault investigations and suggested that publicizing the results of such investigations would be helpful in preventing sexual assaults because perpetrators would see there are consequences for their actions. Research has similarly shown that the decision to commit sexual assault is influenced by the perpetrator’s calculation of possible “costs” such as legal consequences, social retaliation, and harm to one’s reputation/career.⁶ In addition, research has shown that publicly reporting rates of sexual assaults on university/college campuses can be beneficial in creating an environment of transparency and holding the institution accountable for incidents that occur within the student body.⁷

A recent study by the Department of Transportation provides some additional evidence for the deterrent effect of publicizing the potential consequences of law-breaking.⁸ This study found that a high visibility media campaign that communicated that

the enforcement of driving laws (in this case, cell phone bans while driving), in conjunction with actual increased enforcement of the laws, led to lower incidence of the law-breaking behavior. The media campaign was conducted through television, radio and billboards. Law enforcement in the affected communities simultaneously assigned officers dedicated to enforcing the cell phone driving ban, increasing roving patrols and police spotters. Surveys indicated that motorists in the communities with the media/law enforcement campaign, compared to motorists in a control group, reported significantly lower rates of cell phone use while driving during the campaign.

With respect to the prevention of sexual harassment, a recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that DoD needs greater leadership and oversight of sexual harassment programs.⁹ The GAO report stated that DoD has a long-standing policy aimed at providing an environment free of sexual harassment, but some aspects of its programs and policies need improvement. For example, commanders have not been held accountable for completing required assessments of equal opportunity climate, not all commands report sexual harassment complaint data to higher-level offices, and DoD has exercised little oversight of its programs. GAO made five recommendations for DoD:

1. Develop a strategy for holding individuals in leadership accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing sexual harassment policies and programs,
2. Track military commanders' compliance with existing requirements to periodically assess equal opportunity climate through "command climate" assessments,
3. Develop guidance on how incidents of sexual harassment should be handled in joint operation environments,
4. Take steps to ensure that complaint data are complete and accurate with uniform data elements, and
5. Develop and aggressively implement an oversight framework with goals, strategies and criteria for measuring progress.

Recommendations

This section provides the 2011 DACOWITS recommendations on Wellness and summarizes the reasoning in support of these recommendations. The recommendations and reasonings are based on the research and resources summarized in previous sections within this chapter.

Recommendation 1: This recommendation is three-fold and addresses the Committee's view that publicizing the outcomes of sexual assault cases more broadly within the military and on an installation level would be helpful in reducing sexual assaults.

Recommendation

- DoD should publicize reports of sexual assault and their dispositions in a simple format accessible to a wide military audience, to be used in required training and other venues.
- DoD should consider requiring local commanders to publicize, in a timely manner, this same information, including information on reports and dispositions at their specific installations.
- Sexual assault information to be publicized should include the number of reports and type of disciplinary actions taken as a result of sexual assault investigations. Because there may be valid reasons why disciplinary action is not taken in some cases, reasons should be provided for cases where no action is taken. All such information should be in aggregate form, as necessary to conform to any applicable privacy or other legal requirements, taking into account the needs of the victim as appropriate.

Reasoning

Focus group participants stated that Service members are generally unaware of the extent to which there has been follow-up on reported sexual assaults and the disciplinary or other action that has been taken. This lack of awareness makes it hard for Service members to assess whether sexual assaults are actually taken seriously and may be part of the basis for the perception

that rank affects the outcome. This lack of awareness may also lead perpetrators to believe that they are at little risk of being held to account. Finally, lack of awareness may lead to lack of confidence in the SAPR process and to a consequent unwillingness to report assaults. Publicizing information on case dispositions should demonstrate that the military as a whole, as well as individual units, does not tolerate sexual assault and will discipline fairly. Including information on why disciplinary action is not taken in some cases should also foster increased confidence in the system, potentially leading both to fewer assaults and greater reporting of assaults that do occur. This recommendation is consistent not only with focus group participant recommendations but also with research that shows that publicizing enforcement activities and disciplinary outcomes may deter crimes by making clear the cost to the offender.

Although this recommendation pertains to sexual assault, many of the same considerations could apply to sexual harassment cases. The Committee has identified as a continuing concern for possible further consideration whether DoD and the Services should give more attention to the prevention of sexual harassment (as distinct from sexual assault) and the ways in which this might be accomplished. The GAO report on preventing sexual harassment in the military described in the previous section, which was released after DACOWITS voted on its 2011 recommendations, may be especially relevant to any further examination of sexual harassment issues.

Recommendation 2: DoD should include measures of sexual assault and sexual harassment in command climate assessments.

Reasoning

Focus group research and DoD surveys reveal widespread agreement among Service members that sexual assault and sexual harassment have negative effects on military readiness. As Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated with respect to sexual assault in the military, "This type of act not only does unconscionable harm to the victim; it destabilizes the workplace and threatens national security."¹⁰ Both focus group and other research reveal that a positive command climate can help prevent sexual assault and harassment. Yet

measures of sexual assault and sexual harassment are not consistently and expressly taken into account in command climate assessments. Including these measures in command climate assessments would help ensure that prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment is a command priority.

Although this recommendation pertains to command climate assessments, many of the same considerations could apply to including sexual assault and sexual harassment measures in individual performance evaluations of commanders. The Committee has identified this as a continuing concern for possible further consideration.

Continuing Concerns

In the course of examining sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention, the Committee identified several continuing concerns for possible further consideration.

- Whether DoD and the Services should place greater attention on prevention of sexual harassment as distinct from sexual assault.
- Whether effectiveness in combating sexual assault and sexual harassment should be made a part of individual performance evaluations of installation commanders and other leaders.
- Whether additional specialized training should be required for investigators, counselors and victim advocates in sexual assault matters.
- Whether there are special problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the recruiting process and, if so, how they should be addressed.

Chapter 3

Assignments Research and Recommendations

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services



In 2010, DACOWITS recommended that DoD eliminate its 1994 combat exclusion policy, thereby ending gender-based restrictions on military assignments and opening all career fields/specialties, schooling and training opportunities that have been closed to women. As a follow-up to this recommendation, in 2011 DACOWITS decided to examine ways to effectively and fully integrate women into ground combat units, including any potential barriers to such integration. In addition, based on reports gathered by the Committee in 2010, in 2011 DACOWITS decided to examine the adequacy of the weapons training female Service members receive in preparation for deployment to combat zones.

To undertake these examinations, the Committee gathered data directly from Service members in focus groups, received briefings from knowledgeable DoD and Services personnel, and researched current literature and other resources. This chapter summarizes DACOWITS' 2011 findings, recommendations, the reasoning behind the recommendations, and some suggested best practices on these topics. The chapter is organized into the following sections:

- Summary of Select Briefings Presented to DACOWITS
- Summary of Focus Group Findings
- Relevant Literature and Other Resources
- Recommendations
- Best Practices

Summary of Select Briefings Presented to DACOWITS

DACOWITS' research on assignments included briefings from the congressionally established Military Leadership Diversity Commission on the Commission's own 2010 recommendation on the assignment of military women, which was similar to DACOWITS' 2010 recommendation; from DoD on the Women in the Services Restrictions (WISR) review of assignment

policies for women that DoD is undertaking to respond to a FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandate to report to Congress on the results of such a review; from the Marine Corps on the WISR review as it relates specifically to the Corps; and from the Navy on the status of its integration of women into submarine service. This section presents highlights from these briefings on the issues particularly relevant to DACOWITS' 2011 assignment topics; for a full list of briefings presented to DACOWITS in 2011, see *Appendix I*.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) Report Summary, June 2011

Gen, USAF (Ret) Lester Lyles and LTG, Army (Ret) Julius Becton, Jr.

Gen Lester (Ret) Lyles, MLDC Chairman, and LTG (Ret) Julius Becton, Jr., an MLDC member, presented highlights of the 2011 MLDC Report particularly relevant to women in the Services, including MLDC's recommendation that the 1994 DoD policy excluding women from direct ground combat be eliminated. Gen (Ret) Lyles explained that MLDC was created by Congress to evaluate and assess opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers. He noted that Congress charged MLDC with 16 tasks that formed the basis of MLDC's research, analysis, and recommendations. Gen (Ret) Lyles stated that MLDC recommended elimination of the ground combat exclusion primarily because women are currently serving in ground combat but are attached and not assigned to these units, which has prevented these women from receiving due promotional consideration. He also stated that MLDC has had the opportunity to brief all of the Service Chiefs on its recommendations, and confirmed that they were all very supportive of the MLDC recommendations. The Vice Chiefs were present for the MLDC briefings, as were the senior enlisted leaders on most occasions.

Women in the Service Restrictions (WISR) Review, June 2011

Mr. Doug Johnson, Office of Military Personnel Policy

Mr. Doug Johnson, Office of Military Personnel Policy (MPP), provided a briefing on the responsibilities and plans of a new MPP Work Group that is reviewing assignment policies for women: the Women in the Service Restrictions (WISR) Review. He explained the two reasons for the creation of the WISR Review: FY 2011 NDAA, Section 535, which requires a DoD review of, and report to Congress on, restrictions on the service of female Service members, and the Military Leadership Diversity Commission Report Recommendation #9, which urges DoD and the Services to end the policy restricting assignments of women, using a time-phased approach to opening all career fields/specialties to women. Mr. Johnson stated that the primary members of this Work Group are the Service representatives to DACOWITS, but there is also a Senior Leadership Steering Committee. Mr. Johnson stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted an interim report to Congress in May 2011 that identified the laws, policies and regulations being reviewed. The 1994 combat exclusion policy is the primary policy being examined and is open to revision. Mr. Johnson stated that none of the Work Group's decisions may be disclosed in a public forum at this time, but that the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is personally very committed to the process and has stated that the final report will be presented to Congress by October 2011.

USMC Women in the Service Restrictions (WISR) Review, September, 2011

Col John Nettles, USMC

Col John Nettles provided a briefing on the Women in the Service Restrictions Review as it is being undertaken specifically by the Marine Corps. He stated that the Marine Corps will likely lift the restriction in its assignment policy that women cannot be assigned to units that physically "collocate" with ground combat units, acknowledging that this restriction no longer makes sense in today's battlefield environment. As part of the Marine Corps' review of whether its ground combat units should be opened to women, the Corps

is examining more closely the physical tasks generally required of Ground Combat Equivalent (GCE) units and combat arms military occupational specialties (MOSs). In particular, he said, the job-related physical requirements and physical capabilities of female Marines are being analyzed to determine which specific positions are suitable for female Marines. As part of this effort, the continuing applicability to men of the physical requirements will also be analyzed. For example, current GCE standards include the ability to undergo a march of 20 kilometers in 5 hours under a load of 83 pounds and the ability to engage in a "casualty move" of 20 meters under a load of 248 pounds.

As part of this review, Col Nettles said that the Marine Corps has examined Army studies for information on physiology comparisons by gender, which documented lower average aerobic, muscle strength, lifting strength, and road march speeds for women.¹¹ Also, the Marine Corps has examined the injury/attrition rates for women Marines in Entry Level Training. In addition to physical capabilities, the Marine Corps is examining possible recruiting and retention concerns if, as is the case for male Marines now, female Marines were to face the possibility of involuntarily being assigned to infantry positions. Col Nettles cited a 2010 Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) survey of 16-24 year olds in which 29% of women said they would be less likely to join the military if women could serve in combat roles, compared to 12% of women who said they would be more likely to join. Interestingly, most women (58%) said it would not change the likelihood of their joining the military.¹² The Marine Corps is also evaluating the potential impact on social and unit cohesion of the integration of women in ground combat units. Finally, the Marine Corps is looking at the experience of other countries. For example, Col Nettles said that the Australian Defense Force is about five years ahead of the U.S. military with regards to gender integration and may be a model for ways in which the U.S. Armed Forces could successfully open currently closed MOSs to women.

Col Nettles also noted the increased opportunity for women in today's Marine Corps: there are double the number of women pilots since 1991; counter and human intelligence fields were opened to women recently; there are additional women in military police; there are

newly created Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and Cultural Support Teams (CSTs). Additionally, the majority of promotion rates are similar across genders, though there is a difference in promotion rates for men and women at the E9 and O7 levels, which the Marine Corps is analyzing to determine the reasons for this gap.

Status of Integration of Women into Submarine Service, June 2011

LCDR Jean Sullivan, U.S. Navy

LCDR Jean Sullivan presented a briefing on the status of the integration of women into service on submarines. She stated that 20 women were commissioned and selected in FY 2010 for submarine service, and the first group of these women will be integrated into this service in November of 2011. These are highly qualified women, all of whom volunteered for these positions, and the majority of whom have engineering degrees. Eight crews will be integrated and each crew will have two, nuclear-trained, women division officers and one woman warfare-qualified supply corps officer. The decision to integrate each crew in this manner draws on the lessons learned from integrating women onto surface warships by ensuring that more than one woman is on each vessel and that the women submariners have female mentors. LCDR Sullivan stated that, as part of the Navy's preparation of the existing submariner community for this integration, the Navy has focused on ensuring a culture of inclusion and made it clear that hazing and other such behaviors will not be tolerated. LCDR Sullivan also said that, as required by law, the Navy has notified Congress of its intent to expend funds to design the Ohio class replacement SSBN (Ballistic Missile Submarine), and to reconfigure existing submarines, to accommodate female crew members. The integration of female enlisted women into submarine service is part of a deliberate process, informed by the lessons learned from integrating female officers.

Summary of Focus Group Findings

During summer 2011, DACOWITS conducted a total of 21 focus group sessions, at seven locations, to inform its work on both the assignment of military women and the weapons training received by deploying military women. A total of 199 participants attended the focus groups, with a range of

three to 12 and an average of 10 participants per session, representing the entire Active component (AC) Services and some elements of the Reserve component (RC). Each focus group session included Service members who had deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and/or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), including junior and senior, enlisted and officer, women and men.¹³

The majority of focus group participants were female (70%). Almost half of participants were non-Hispanic White (48%), just over a quarter were non-Hispanic Black (26%), and almost a fifth were Hispanic (19%). The Army was the most represented Service, with over a quarter (28%) of participants, followed by the Marine Corps (21%), Navy (17%), Air Force (14%), Army National Guard (13%), and Reserves¹⁴ (8%).¹⁵ Nearly half of participants were junior or senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs – E5-E9; 45%), and roughly a third were officers (33%; O1-O6, and including Warrant and Chief Warrant Officers), and almost half of participants had served more than ten years in the military (42%). Half of participants were married (50%). For a complete summary of the demographic characteristics of these focus group participants, see *Appendix F-2*.

The methodology used by DACOWITS to identify salient themes related to the assignment of military women and the weapons training of deployed women in the 2011 focus groups is the same approach used to identify salient themes related to the Wellness sexual assault and sexual harassment topics, described in Chapter II.

Weapons Training

To explore whether women are receiving adequate weapons training in preparation for deployment, DACOWITS asked women and men focus group participants a series of questions about their weapons training. The vast majority of participants said that they have received weapons training. Although the majority of participants – both women and men – reported on the mini-survey that accompanied each focus group that the weapons training they have received is adequate, as this topic was explored in more detail during the focus group discussions, most participants subsequently described their weapons training as inadequate in some respects. Some reported that they had a bare minimum

amount of training. The most commonly cited inadequacies included: inconsistencies among Services, installations and MOSs; poor quality training, and not enough training; and trainers not taking training seriously enough.

Some participants stated that they thought the reason, at least in part, for the pre-deployment weapons training inadequacies is lack of sufficient funding. With respect to whether the training varied between the genders, the majority of focus group participants stated that the pre-deployment training did not vary by gender. However, some women focus group participants reported that they or others they knew of were issued new types of weapons once they arrived in theatre, ones on which they had not previously been trained. Some said they received training on these weapons then, but others reported that their training in theatre on these weapons was inadequate.

Full Integration of Women into Combat Units

To explore ways to effectively integrate women into ground combat units, and any barriers to such integration, DACOWITS asked women and men focus group participants a series of questions. These included questions about lessons learned from the previous integration of women onto combat ships and aircraft, impact on unit readiness if women were to be fully integrated, potential challenges that may arise to women's full integration into combat units, and the degree to which mentoring might aid women's integration.

Views on Eliminating the Assignment Policy

Although DACOWITS did not explicitly ask focus group participants their opinions on whether the current assignment policy for military women should be eliminated, this question arose during several of the focus group discussions. Of those who shared their views, most were in support of changing the policy to open all specialties, including ground combat positions, to women, although a few participants expressed opposition to women serving in ground combat. Some participants expressed the view that women will be able to successfully serve in ground combat as long as the

standards are the same for both men and women. A few expressed concern that women who have served in ground combat unofficially are currently not receiving due recognition.

Ways to Effectively Integrate Women into Combat Units

DACOWITS asked women focus group participants who have served in combat ships or aircraft, as well as men who have served alongside women in combat ships and aircraft, to share their experiences and lessons learned from these experiences, and to assess whether the military might apply these lessons to the full integration of women into ground combat units. These discussions led to several suggestions on the ways to make full integration a success, including having consistent and equal performance metrics and qualification criteria for both men and women, having strong leadership support for this transition, integrating women in large numbers rather than one or two at a time, and having appropriate training and mentoring.

Specifically with respect to mentoring, most focus group participants stated that mentoring would be helpful, to both women and men, to successfully integrate women into ground combat units. Several also noted that any mentoring program needs to be gender-neutral, so as not to single out women as the only ones needing mentoring. When asked about what forms of mentoring would be helpful, some participants said that same-gender mentors are preferable, while others believed that mentors of both genders would be helpful. A few also said that informal mentoring is better than a "check-the-box" formal mentoring program.

Possible Impact on Readiness

DACOWITS asked focus group participants to share their thoughts on the potential impact on military readiness of women's full integration into combat units. Most focus group participants said that they thought it would either have a positive or no impact on military readiness, but a few thought it would have a negative impact (e.g., the perceived lack of strength or emotionality of women). Some participants also said that there might be short-term impact during the transition of women into combat units, but that any negative effect would disappear over time.

Possible Challenges

DACOWITS asked focus group participants to consider, if women were fully integrated into combat units, the challenges that might arise. Specifically, participants were asked about whether there would be challenges related to: the success of the unit and its mission, the careers of individual women, and the well-being of women. Although most focus group participants were in support of fully integrating women into combat units, many noted several barriers to integration, such as the need to address cultural issues in a male-dominated environment and the possible increased potential for sexual harassment and assault, as well as inappropriate fraternization and logistical issues (e.g., facilities, hygiene, and access to health care).

Relevant Literature and Other Resources

The following review of literature and other resources focuses on the Committee's Assignment topics. Additional resources are summarized in *Appendix H-2*.

Additional Support for Full Integration of Women into Combat Units

In its 2010 report, DACOWITS reviewed the sources beyond briefings and focus group research in support of its recommendation to eliminate the 1994 DoD combat exclusion policy. This section summarizes sources of support that were not noted in the 2010 recommendations or previous DACOWITS reports, as well as sources of support that originated in the past year.

As described in DACOWITS' 2010 report, and earlier in this report, in December of 2010, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) recommended the elimination of the 1994 combat exclusion policy.¹⁶ In March of 2010, MLDC issued a report further elaborating on its reasoning in support of this recommendation. That report states that an increased need for diverse military leadership informed the Commission's recommendation, and that MLDC concluded the combat exclusion policy prevents women from entering tactical career fields that lead to "career-enhancing assignments" and that are associated with significantly higher promotion opportunities. With MLDC's

recommendation to eliminate the combat exclusion policy for women, however, came the caveat that qualification standards for combat arms positions should not be lowered because of a change in assignment policy. The Commission also considered the potential impact on military readiness brought about by women in combat and concluded that any negative impact on readiness would be negligible, noting that similar arguments were made against racial integration but never borne out. In fact, the Commission cited DACOWITS' 2009 finding that a majority of focus group participants thought that women serving in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan had a positive effect on mission accomplishment. The Commission also cited testimony that commanders in theatre should be able to pick the most capable person for the job. The Commission further found that women are engaging in combat, given the current operational environment. Finally, many Commissioners consider the current policy fundamentally unfair and discriminatory since it requires assignments based on gender without regard to capabilities or qualifications.

As noted in the 2010 DACOWITS Report, numerous high-ranking military commanders have expressed general support for eliminating restrictions on the assignment of military women as well.¹⁷ Since that report, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta expressed his commitment to equal opportunity for all women and men in uniform upon the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell:

*This is a historic day for the Pentagon and for the nation. As Secretary of Defense, I'm committed to removing all the barriers that would prevent Americans from serving their country and from rising to the highest level of responsibility that their talents and capabilities warrant. These are men and women that put their lives on the line in the defense of this country—that's what should matter the most.*¹⁸

President Obama similarly stated on that day, "It is time to recognize that sacrifice, valor and integrity are no more defined by sexual orientation than they are by race or gender, religion or creed."¹⁹

More directly, in commenting on the DoD WISR review of assignment restrictions for women, Army Chief of Staff GEN Raymond T. Odierno publicly stated his support for expanding the roles of women in the military: "We need them there. We need their talent.... This is about managing talent.

We have incredibly talented females who should be in those [combat] positions. We have work to do within the [Defense Department] to get them to recognize and change.”²⁰

Public support for allowing women to serve in direct combat roles is substantial as well. For example, on March 16, 2011, the Washington Post and ABC News released a poll showing that 73% of Americans support allowing military women to serve in ground units engaging in close combat. Majority support for women in ground combat was widespread: 73% of women and 72% of men, 80% of Democrats and 62% of Republicans, 79% of those with college degrees and 66% of those with less than a high school education, and 86% of individuals under the age of 31 and 57% of senior citizens expressed support for women in direct ground combat.²¹

Potential Obstacles Facing Integration of Women into Combat Units

Col Nettles’ briefing on the Marine Corps’ WISR review revealed that a significant consideration in deciding whether to open ground combat positions to women is whether women are physically able to meet the demands of ground combat. In a similar vein, DACOWITS’ focus group research elicited comments from some participants that all military positions should be opened to women if they can meet the same standards applied to men, presumably referring primarily to physical standards. MLDC, in its recommendation to open all military positions to women, also cautioned that implementation of its recommendation should not result in a lowering of the qualification standards for these positions.

A recent article by Maia B. Goodell, an attorney and former Surface Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy, draws on studies of vocational testing, athletics, and military fitness to examine in some detail what she terms the “physical-strength rationale” for excluding women from military combat positions.²² She identifies four problems with the physical-strength argument: stereotyping, differential training, trait selection, and task definition. She concludes that “[w]hat appears to be a biological truth is actually better understood as a normative belief that the military’s job is in some way

peculiarly suited to men. It is not that women’s bodies do not measure up against an objective standard, but that the standard is defined so women do not fit it.”²³

The first difficulty with the physical strength rationale, Ms. Goodell asserts, is that it is based in part on the gender stereotype that because some women cannot pass the physical tests to serve in particular positions, no woman should be permitted to serve. That the exclusion is based on a gender stereotype is clear from the fact that the same principle is not applied to men. Ms. Goodell also summarizes Supreme Court and other case law holding that governmental policies cannot differentiate between men and women based on such gender stereotypes, including *Owens v. Brown* (a district court case),²⁴ which declared unconstitutional an act of Congress that prevented women’s assignment to most Navy vessels. The appropriate substitute for determinations based on gender stereotyping, she states, is determinations based on individual evaluation and qualifications.

The second difficulty with the physical-strength rationale, in Ms. Goodell’s view, is that it “leap[s] to the conclusion that the observed differences in physical strength [between men and women] must be entirely inherent.”²⁵ To refute this conclusion, she cites several studies, including those involving military women, demonstrating that the differences are not solely inherent and that appropriate training can reduce them significantly. A study not cited by Ms. Goodell, conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine in November 1997, found that only 24% of women volunteers were initially found capable of performing tasks normally conducted by men in the military. However, after 24 weeks of training, this figure rose significantly—to 78%.²⁶ Evidence supporting the impact of training can also be drawn from a 2002 U.K. Ministry of Defence study, which reviewed over 100 works comparing the physicality of men and women. The study noted that proper training greatly increased women’s physical ability, and to some extent this ability rose in greater proportion in women compared to men, particularly in aerobic conditioning.²⁷

The third difficulty with the physical-strength rationale, in Ms. Goodell’s analysis, is its trait selection, by which she means that women are too often measured

against physical standards that may not have been validated, even for men. In the civilian world, to pass muster under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex and other forms of discrimination in employment, an employment standard that has a differential impact on women and men must be shown to validly predict job performance.²⁸ She notes that there were several challenges to physical-strength standards under this standard when women first competed for jobs as police and firefighters and that the military itself does not “hold [its] general physical-fitness requirements to map onto job-specific requirements. In fact, the military has different requirements based on age group and sex.”²⁹ After reviewing the studies on trait selection, including those involving military women, as well as actual performance in “real life examples,”³⁰ Ms. Goodell concludes that too often it is “the strategic selection of the measures, not the job requirements,” that leads to the gap between women and men’s physical abilities, when one exists.³¹

Finally, with regard to task definition, Ms. Goodell argues that it would not be a burden for the military, an organization that is constantly redefining and improving itself to maintain its competitive advantage, to redefine some tasks to address women’s differing physical abilities. It may even be a benefit. For example, based on empirical study of some of women’s so-far unmeasured physical characteristics, such as their smaller stature or greater endurance, some military tasks could be redesigned in ways that advantage everyone.³²

Ms. Goodell concludes that the physical strength rationale sacrifices military readiness based on “inaccurate views about women’s and men’s ability.... [and] leads to excluding available personnel who not only would be capable of doing the job, but also might do it better.”³³

Other Sources of Information on Ways to Achieve Full Integration of Women into Combat Units

Should the U.S. open ground combat positions to women in the military as DACOWITS has recommended, it would not be the first country to do so. Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Austria and Ireland all have women serving in combat arms positions.³⁴ Australia recently opened combat jobs to women.³⁵

While little doubt remains that women are performing to the standards of their male colleagues, they have faced significant challenges—many of them cultural in nature—integrating into a male-defined and male-dominated workforce.³⁶ Canada offers the U.S. a particularly useful historical precedent for gender integration in the military. In 1989, the Canadian forces decided to fully integrate women into all positions, including combat arms, over a 10-year period, after a long, deliberative process that considered the roles of women military members dating to a 1970 report from the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.³⁷

A study of the experience of other countries was beyond the scope of this report, but DACOWITS may wish to examine this in greater depth in the future.

Recommendations

This section provides the 2011 DACOWITS recommendations on Assignments and summarizes the reasoning in support of these recommendations. The recommendations and reasonings are based on the research and resources summarized in previous sections within this chapter.

Recommendation 1: DoD should eliminate the 1994 combat exclusion policy and direct the Services to eliminate their respective assignment rules, thereby ending the gender-based restrictions on military assignments. Concurrently, DoD and the Services should open all related career fields/specialties, schooling and training opportunities that have been closed to women as a result of the DoD combat exclusion policy and service assignment policies.

Reasoning

This recommendation repeats the recommendation made by DACOWITS in 2010. As described in DACOWITS’ 2010 Report, that recommendation was grounded in focus group and other research gathered by the Committee in 2009 and additional research supporting the expansion of roles of women gathered by the Committee in 2010. Because DoD is at this time reviewing the 1994 combat exclusion policy in response to a congressional directive to do so, DACOWITS believes it is important to repeat and re-emphasize this recommendation. Moreover,

the Committee continued to find strong support for this recommendation in its focus group and other research conducted this year, including in the final report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission and the statements of high-ranking DoD personnel. Equally important, the Committee found no insurmountable obstacles to integrating women into currently closed positions.

Recommendation 2: The Services should develop appropriate physical standards by MOS, relevant to the job to be performed.

Reasoning

The Committee’s 2010 recommendation, repeated above in 2011, would end gender-based restrictions on military assignments. This would mean opening to women combat arms career fields and MOSs that are currently closed, allowing women to compete for all assignments for which they are qualified. The Committee is concerned, however that DoD and the Services, in the review that they are currently undertaking of assignment policies for women, may be evaluating women on an “average” rather than an individual basis and may be using or establishing standards to judge women’s qualifications that have not been validated, even for men. Instead, the selection of military personnel for assignment should be based on individual qualifications, not on gender or other stereotyped concepts of women’s or men’s capabilities. The qualifications should be those necessary to perform the actual duties of a specific military job and any standards for the job, especially physical standards, should be validated to ensure that they accurately predict job performance.

Recommendation 3: In addition to a general increase in quality of pre-deployment weapons training, the Services should ensure that deployed Service members receive appropriate in-country weapons training on the weapons used by the units in which they are serving in theatre.

Reasoning

Focus group participants, both men and women, described their pre-deployment weapons training as inadequate in some respects. Some reported receiving a bare minimum of training, and some complained about the quality and consistency of the training. Additionally, some women focus group participants reported that, once in theatre, they were issued new weapons on which they had not been previously trained and that weapons training while deployed was inadequate. The Committee believes that weapons training both pre- and post-deployment should be improved for both women and men Service members.

Best Practices

In the course of examining ways to effectively integrate women into combat units, DACOWITS identified, and wished to suggest, several best practices.

Best Practice 1: Leaders should adopt practices similar to those that were implemented during the process of the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, in which they visibly support the integration of women into currently closed positions.

Comment

Leadership is key to the successful implementation of new policies and programs. It is very apparent that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines get on board with new programs when the leaders at all levels of the organization support the new policies and programs and actively demonstrate their support, including during briefings and training.

Best Practice 2: The Services should employ a phased approach for a full integration of women into all currently closed combat assignments. At a minimum, several women should be integrated into units at a time. The integration should occur in the combat engineers, artillery, and armor followed by the infantry.

Comment

The integration of women into combat units will require that some facilities be modified, training be reviewed, and testing be conducted to ensure that job-related standards are employed in selecting Service members for particular assignments. Navy experience in bringing women onto warships supports the practice of integrating women into currently closed units several at a time. The Committee believes that, since women are already present in some MOSs and various levels in the combat engineers and artillery, the transition of women into these units should be relatively easy. The transition into armor and infantry could require more time and effort.

Best Practice 3: DoD and the Services should have more of an emphasis on mentorship, both formal and informal. However, leadership needs to encourage and support informal mentorship.

Comment

During focus group sessions the importance of mentorship was discussed. Although mentoring is important to all Service members, it will be especially important for the women who are integrated into combat units. Informal mentoring, because it is not done to meet a requirement, can be more appealing because all involved have chosen to be in a mentoring relationship.

Best Practice 4: The Services should assure their recruitment policies fully support the successful integration of women into the combat arms.

Comment

If restrictions on the assignment of women are lifted as DACOWITS has recommended, it will be important for all Services to attract and recruit both men and women to serve in the combat arms. Some current policies may unnecessarily discourage potential recruits from considering such service – and possibly service in the military itself. For example, the Marines tell recruits that they may be put into the infantry involuntarily, even though such involuntary assignments seldom occur. The Marine Corps should review its policy of involuntarily assigning recruits to infantry.

Endnotes

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services



1. Dr. Rachel Lipari, in her briefing to DACOWITS on the DMDC survey, explained that the survey purposely uses the terms “unwanted sexual contact,” which it defines to include the behaviors prohibited as sexual assault in Article 20 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, instead of “sexual assault,” because sexual assault to some people only means rape and in some respects the military definition of sexual assault is broader than the civilian definition.
2. Ibid.
3. Brubaker, S.J. (2009). Sexual assault prevalence, reporting and policies: Comparing college and university campuses and military service academies. *Security Journal*, 22, 56-72. doi: 10.1057/sj.2008.10.
4. Harrell, M. & Castaneda, L.W. (2009). *A Compendium of Sexual Assault Research*. RAND National Defense Research Institute.
5. Firestone, J.M. & Harris, R.J. (2009). Sexual harassment in the U.S. Military Reserve Component. *Armed Forces & Society*, 36(1), 86-102. doi: 10.1177/0095327X09332152.
6. Bachman, R., Paternoster, R., & Ward, S. (1992). The rationality of sexual offending: Testing a deterrence/rational choice conception of sexual assault. *Law and Society Review*, 26(2), 343-372.
7. Brubaker, S.J. (2009). Sexual assault prevalence, reporting and policies: Comparing college and university campuses and military service academies. *Security Journal*, 22, 56-72. doi: 10.1057/sj.2008.10.
8. Cosgrove, L., Chaudhary, N. & Reagan, I. (2011). Four High-Visibility Demonstration Waves in Connecticut and New York Reduce Hand-Held Phone Use. (Report No. DOT HS 811 845) Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Retrieved from <http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811845.pdf>.
9. U.S. General Accountability Office (September 2011). *Preventing sexual harassment: DoD needs greater leadership commitment and oversight framework*. (GAO-11-809: Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives).
10. Department of Defense Sexual Assault and Prevention Office (2011). *Department of Defense annual report on sexual assault in the military: FY 2010*. Retrieved from http://www.sapr.mil/media/pdf/reports/DoD_Fiscal_Year_2010_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf.
11. Harper, W.H., Knapik, J.J. & Pontbriand, R. (1997). Female load-carrying performance. *Army Research Laboratory*. U.S.A: ARL-TR-1176; Rayson, M., Holliman, D. & Belyavin, A. (2000). Development of physical selection procedures for the British Army. Phase 2: Relationship between physical performance tests and criterion tasks. *Ergonomics*, 43, 73-105; and Sharp, M.A., Knapik, J.J., Patton, J.F., Smutok, M.A., Hauret, K., Chervak, M., Ito, M., Mello, R.P., Frykman, P.N. & Jones, B.H. (2000). Physical fitness of soldiers entering and leaving Basic Combat Training. USARIEM Technical Report T00-13. Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA3743>.

12. Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies. (2011). *DoD advertising tracking study: Women in combat analysis*. Unpublished briefing.
13. For this study, DACOWITS defined junior Service members as those in ranks E1 through E6, and senior Service members as those in ranks E7 through E9 and all officers.
14. Reserves include Army Reserves and Navy Reserves.
15. DACOWITS visited a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) installation in 2011; however, no Assignments topic focus groups were conducted (Wellness topic focus groups were conducted).
16. Military Leadership Diversity Commission (March 2011). *From representation to inclusion: Diversity leadership for the 21st century military, Final Report*.
17. Of note are comments from General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of the Army: Chiarelli, Peter W. (28 July 2010). Guest Blog: Women in the Army. *Combined Arms Center Blog*. Retrieved from <http://usacacblogs.army.mil/guestblog/2010/07/27/>; and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Mullen, Mike (5 November 2010). Chairman's corner: Too many doors still closed for women. *DoD Live*. Retrieved from <http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2010/11/chairmans-corner-too-many-doors-still-closed-for-women/>.
18. Lee, M.J. (20 September 2011). End of 'don't ask, don't tell' is a 'historic day,' says Leon Panetta. *Politico*. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63962.html>.
19. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2010). Statement by the President on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 [Press release]. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/18/statement-president-dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-act-2010>.
20. Bacon, L. M. (22 October 2011). Odierno backs expanding role of women in combat. *Army Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/10/army-ray-odierno-endorses-expanding-women-role-in-combat-102211w/>.
21. See O'Keefe, E. & Cohen, J. (16 March 2011). Most Americans back women in combat roles, poll says. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/politics/most-americans-back-women-in-combat-roles-poll-says/2011/03/16/ABTereg_story.html; and Langer, G. (16 March 2011) "Three-Quarters Back Women in Combat Roles. *The Numbers: A run at the latest data from ABC's Poobah of Polling*, Gary Langer. <http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenumbers/2011/03/three-quarters-back-women-in-combat-roles.html>.
22. Goodell, M.B. (2010). Physical strength rationales for de jure exclusion of women from military combat positions. *Seattle University Law Review*, 34, 17-50.
23. Goodell (2010), p. 47.
24. 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
25. Goodell (2010), p. 36.
26. Harman, E., Frykman, P.C., Lammi, E., Reynolds, K. & Backus, V. (November 1997). *Effects of a specifically designed physical conditioning program on the load carriage and lifting performance of female soldiers*. Natick, MA: Military Performance Division, U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine. (Report No. T98-1).
27. Ministry of Defence. (May 2002). *Women in the armed forces*. London: Ministry of Defence. Retrieved from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A9925990-82C2-420F-AB04-7003768CEC02/0/womenaf_fullreport.pdf.
28. For relevant Title VII cases, see *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); *Albamarle Paper Co. v. Moody*, 422 U.S. 405 (1974); 29 C.F.R. Section 1607 (2009).
29. Goodell (2010), p. 41.
30. Ibid, p. 39-44.
31. Ibid, p. 44.
32. Ibid, p. 45.
33. Ibid, p. 50.
34. Davis, K. & McKee (2004). Women in the military: Facing the warrior framework. In *Challenge and change in the military: Gender and diversity issues*. Ed. By Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P. & Okros, A.C. Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press.
35. Smith, S. MP: Minister for Defence (27 September 2011). Removal of restrictions on combat roles for women, 27 Sept 2011. *Media release: Australian Government, Department of Defense*.
36. Katzenstein, M.F. & Reppy, J. (Eds.). (1999). *Beyond zero tolerance: Discrimination in military culture*. Lanham, Md: Rowmen & Littlefield.
37. Davis, K. (2007). From ocean ops to combat ops: A short history of women and leadership in the Canadian Forces. *Women and leadership in the Canadian Forces: Perspectives and experiences*. Ed. by Davis, K. Ontario: Canadian Defense Academy Press.

